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Courting Risk: ^^^
Disability, Masculinity, and Liability
on Iowa's Railroads, 1868-1900
JOHN WILLIAMS-SEARLE
SEPTEMBER 9, 1868, should have been just another day for
Edward Laughlin. The twenty-one-year-old brakeman had
worked for the Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad—part of the
nUnois Central—for five years. His employer regarded him as
"a good industrious man, and a skillful brakeman," claiming
that "no man . . . had a better prospect of promotion."' On this
day, however, as he attempted to couple two freight cars to a
mail car at the Ackley, Iowa, station, something went horribly
wrong. After riding the cars down a grade to the mail car,
Laughlin hopped off and ran ahead to make the coupling. Ide-
ally, the bumpers on the end of the cars should have met with
a gentle thump, allowing Laughlin to slip between to insert
the coupling link and drop the pin. It was a risky business, but
he had coupled thousands of cars and thought he could time
his move precisely. On this night, however, the cars were rolling
too quickly. As he darted between them, the cars slammed to-
gether, their bumpers misaligned, and their platforms collided.
Laughlin screamed as the end of the brake rod jammed into his
stomach. He hung there, crushed and impaled. In less than a sec-
ond, Laughlin had joined the ranks of the disabled railroader.^
I would like to thank Shelton Stromquist, Bridgett Williams-Searle, and four
anonymous readers for their comments and assistance. The research contained
herein was supported by funding received from the State Historical Society of
Iowa and the Newberry Library, Chicago.
1. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 1 and 15, Muldoîimey v. Illinois Central Ry.
Co., 36 Iowa 462 (1873).
2. Ibid., 4-7,14-15.
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As rail use and track mileage in the United States grew
during the Gilded Age, so too did the number of railroad
workers killed and injured on the job.^  In 1889, the first year
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) compiled national
statistics on accidents, railroad companies reported that one
out of every 375 employees had been killed in the previous
year, while one out of 35 had been injured. An unknown num-
ber suffered from unreported injuries. Locomotive engineers,
firemen, conductors, and brakemen faced an even greater risk
of harm. Of the men employed directly in these "running
trades," known collectively as trainmen, one out of every 117
had been killed; one in every 12 was injured.^ Commentators
reached for metaphors of war to describe the camage. In 1892
Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge drew a direct parallel be-
tween employee accidents and war casualties. "The object of
trainmen is to carry on safely the railway traffic of a great
country. Yet they suffer as if they were fighting a war, and the
percentage of loss to numbers employed, if not so high as with
soldiers, is frightful enough."''
Edward Laughiin, like the thousands of others who fell on a
battleground of rails and ties, had few resources with which to
sustain himself. How did Laughiin and his comrades in arms,
most too young to withdraw from the work force, cope with the
economic, legal, and emotional ramifications of work-related
injury? Although industrial capitalism created broken bodies
almost as efficiently as it created market goods, historians are
not yet prepared to answer that question. Crystal Eastman first
articulated the complex interlinkage of technology, safety, dis-
3. In I860 the United States contained 30,626 miles of track; by 1890, this num-
ber had risen to 166,703 miles, and by 1900 to 193,346 miles. Maury Klein, Un-
finished Business: Tîie Railroad in American Life (Hanover, NH, 1994), 13,21.
4. These company-authored reports probably grossly underestimated the
number of injuries. Expressed in whole numbers, 1,972 railroaders were killed
and 20,028 were injured on the job in 1889. U.S. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, Second Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways in the United States to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for the Year Ending June 30, 1889 (Washington,
DC, 1890), 36-38; Walter Licht, Worbngfor the Railroad: The Organization of Work
in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ, 1983), 190.
5. Henry Cabot Lodge, "A Perilous Business and the Remedy," North American
Review 154 (1892), 191.
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ability, law, and masculirüty in 1910.* Yet subsequent scholars
have impeded a coherent understanding of occupational dis-
ability by treating each of those issues as a separate category of
inquiry. For example, works about railroad safety emphasize
technology or management policies, ignoring the workers for
whom safety was a life or death issue/ In reality, however, rail-
road workers' attempts to cope with risk and disability, like
management policies, both preceded technological advance-
ments and changed in response to technological and legal de-
velopments. Books on workplace casualties, meanwhile, ap-
proach the problem from the perspective of industrial medidne.
Medical historians treat afflicted workers as statistical aggre-
gates, failing to examine how responses to injury were shaped
by workers' understandings of the ideological relationships
between risk, gender, disability, and capitalism.* Legal histori-
ans address developments in tort law but divorce the evolution
of legal wisdom from the context of the workplace.' Finally,
6. See Crystal Eastman, Work Accidents and the Law, The Pittsburgh Survey,
vol. 2 (New York, 1910). Eastman's work, long neglected, should serve as a
theoretical starting point for the study of occupational disability.
7. Charles Hugh Clark, "The Railroad Safety Movement in the United States:
Origins and Development, 1869 to 1893" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Illinois,
1966); Steven W. Usselman, "Air Brakes for Freight Trains: Technological Inno-
vation in the American Railroad Industry, 1869-1900," Business History Revieiv
58 (1984), 30-50; and, to a lesser extent, Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology,
Labor, and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-1939 (Baltimore,
1997), chaps. 1 and 5. For management responses to the safety crisis, see Kurt
Wetzel, "Railroad Management's Response to Operating Employees Accidents,
1890-1913," Labor History 21 (1980), 351-68.
8. See T. Lyle Hazlett and William W. Hummel, Industrial Medicine in Western
Pennsylvania, 1850-1950 (Pittsburgh, 1957); Martin Chemiack, The Hawk's Nest
Incident: America's Worst Industrial Disaster (New Haven, CT, 1986); Jacqueline
Kamell Com, Response to Occupational Health Hazards: A Historical Perspective
(New York, 1992); and Christopher C. Sellers, Hazards of the Job: From Industrial
Disease to Environmental Health Science (Chapel Hill, NC, 1997). For two im-
portant exceptions, see David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, Deadly Dust:
Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease in Twentieth-Century America
(Princeton, NJ, 1991); and Alan Derickson, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public
Health Disaster (Ithaca, NY, 1998).
9. In an important departure from the general treatment of accident law, John
Fabian Witt argues that workers' desire to control their workplaces actually
hindered workers' compensation reform in the nineteenth century. Corpora-
tions, he contends, avoided accident liability by endorsing the notion that
workers should assume all responsibility for workplace safety; management
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trainmen's changing perceptions of risk and disability were col-
ored by their views on marüiness, worker control, and personal
responsibility. Although labor historians have demonstrated
that male workers' cot\structions of class identity were situated
in a particular conception of manhood, historians of American
manhood have usually ignored the class content of masculine
ideals.'" Historians of disability, likewise, suggest that people
with disabilities serve as an embodied "other" against which
"normal" male and female bodies and lives are evaluated, but
few labor historians apply that insight when they theorize
about worker-management relations or manhood." Each subset
of scholars has felt a different part of the elephant; none has
fully described its essence."
and workers agreed that injury was an indication of moral failing or negli-
gence on the part of the injured. By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
workers surrendered some aspects of job control in exchange for an acknowl-
edgment of corporate liability in accident cases. See "The Transformation of
Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910," Yale Law Journal 107
(1998), 1467-1502.
10. Although the term manhood is usually missing, David Montgomery,
Workers' Control in America (New York, 1979), argues that skilled craftsmen
tried to maintain their autonomy in the workplace as managers attempted to
undermine craftsmen's se If-direction. Subsequent historians have demon-
strated that this battle for autonomy was fought on gendered terrain. See
Joshua B. Freeman, "Hardhats: Construction Workers, Manliness, and the
1970 Pro-War Demonstrations," Journal of Social History 26 (1993), 725-44;
Alice Kessler-Harris, "Treating the Male as 'Other': Redefining the Parameters
of Labor History/' Labor History 34 (1993), 190-204; Ava Baron, ed.. Work
Engendered: Toward a New History of American Labor (Ithaca, NY, 1991); Nick
Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist (Urbana and Chicago, 1982);
Robert E. Weir, Beyond Labor's Veil: The Culture of the Knights of Labor (Urüversity
Park, PA, 1996); and David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the
Making of the American Working Class (New York, 1991). For works on man-
hood that ignore class-based constructions of masculiruty, see Michael Kim-
mel. Manhood in America: A Cultural History (New York, 1996); and E. Anthony
Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution
to the Modem Era (New York, 1993).
11. See Lennard J. Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body
(New York, 1995); and Susan Wendell, "Toward a Feminist Theory of Disabil-
ity," Hypatia 42 (1989), 104-22.
12. The best recent effort at making a coherent whole out of these approaches
is Alan Derickson, Workers' Health, Workers' Democracy: The Western Miners'
Struggle, 1891-1925 (Ithaca, NY, 1988). Derickson argues that the Western Fed-
eration of Miners grappled with the constant threat and reality of injury and
disability through health and welfare programs designed to defeat the un-
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Historical research on occupational disability, therefore, is
in need of a unified theoretical approach. The study of disabil-
ity, properly considered, transects the histories of labor, busi-
ness, medicine, law, reform, public policy formation, and gen-
der relations. Male workers conceived manliness largely in
terms of bodily wholeness and economic independence. Ac-
cordingly, they constructed their ideals of manhood not only
in opposition to women, but also in opposition to the femi-
nized, dependent, disabled male. Discourses of masculinity
and disability shaped each other, profoundly affecting the
ways workers managed risk and addressed safety concerns.
During the Gilded Age, moreover, public and corporate poli-
cies on the treatment of disabled workers were shaped not
only by the availability and affordability of safety technologies,
but also by workers' responses to safety issues. The struggle
for safer work sites, carried on in courtrooms and legislative
chambers as well as on the job, thus became a front in the battle
to define the relationship among workers, management, and
the state.
Iowa provides an excellent venue in which to explore the
broad historical significance of occupational disability in Ameri-
can society. A variety of sources reveal that Iowa's disabled
railroaders faced profound hindrances to recovery (either phys-
ical or financial) during the Gilded Age. Several major rail-
roads employed Iowa workers. Each of those companies kept
meticulous records of their dealings with injured workers as
well as of their respective safety policies. Moreover, Iowa courts
frequently heard cases concerning railroaders' accidents, pro-
viding abundant evidence of changing attitudes toward dis-
abled workers in the workplace and in court. Not all of Iowa's
railroaders were members of the railroad brotherhoods that
represented the interests of trainmen, but those associations
were strong enough to help shape the terms of the emerging
debate over safety, disability, and corporate responsibility in
Iowa. Worker organizations (such as the Cedar Rapids-based
sympathetic dictates of the mining companies. With an increased awareness of
gender as a category of analysis, Derickson's work should provide a template
for future historians who wish to integrate the study of risk, safety, disability,
manliness, and labor.
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Order of Railway Conductors) combined efforts with safety
advocates (such as Iowa Railroad Commissioner Lorenzo S.
Coffin) to fight for passage of the Iowa Safety Appliance Act
(1890). That measure, which required railroads to ir\stall life-
saving technology, became a model for national safety legisla-
tion." In some ways, Iowa offers a glimpse of the best-case
scenario for American trainmen in the late nineteenth century,
for events in Iowa often served as a lead indicator of national
trends. On the other hand, the substantial challenges that even
Iowans such as Edward Laughlin faced also exemplify the
difficult situation that disabled workers across the nation
confronted.
EDWARD LAUGHLIN shared the circumstances of other dis-
abled trainmen of his day. An in-depth examination of his case
helps to provide a ser\se of the interconnections between dis-
ability, corporate benevolence, and liability law. Laughlin sur-
vived his catastrophic accident. In a few days, he was moved
to Dimleith, Illinois, near Dubuque, where his mother, step-
father, and some neighbors cared for him. After a few weeks of
bed rest, he walked outdoors with a cane. His chances for re-
covery seemed bright. By early November, however, his con-
dition had worsened and he was again confined to bed. His
suffering became unendurable. He writhed from continuous
abdominal pain; his ulcers needed daily lancing. A neighbor,
Mrs. Dugan, stated, "Many times he would stuff his handker-
chief into his mouth to keep himself frorn screaming." Because
the accident had crushed Laughlin's intestines, he excreted
through a hole in his back. Understandably, the turnover rate
among his nurses was high. A friend from Dunleith described
the scene. "The smell was so bad I could not stand it. I had to
go out doors several times. I do not know what it was worth to
nurse him. I would not have done it at any price." Even his
mother remarked, "There was no end to the offensiveness of
it." Although the initial prognosis had been favorable, the
damage to Laughlin's intestines prevented his body from ab-
13. See Lorenzo S. Coffin, "Safety Appliances on the Railroads," Annals of Iowa
5 (1903), 561-82.
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sorbing nutrients. Weeks passed and Laughiin dwir\dled. As
Mrs. Dugan later testified, "There was no fiesh on him.""
What kind of financial and social support might Edward
Laughiin have expected as he and his family grappled with the
new realities of his disability? If Laughiin had been injured a
decade earlier, his employer, the Illinois Central (IC), might
have responded differently to his misfortune. During the 1850s
and early 1860s, the IC had often paid hospital and funeral ex-
per\ses for its employees. In the mid-1860s, the line had also re-
quired its employees to carry accident insurance, the first rail-
road to do so. Employees automatically became members of the
Illinois Central Relief Club, forfeiting 0.5 percent of their pay to
support the plan. Trainmen, however, objected to compulsory
enrollment and resented that company officers controlled dis-
bursements. After four years of protests, officials made the plan
voluntary. Membership immediately plummeted, and the ex-
periment quietly expired.'^ If Laughiin had expected the IC to
aid him éurough a rationalized employee welfare plan, he
would have been out of luck.
Laughiin still might have hoped for company aid, however.
If a railroad manager thought that the injured worker was
worthy and might return to useful service, he might attempt to
help.'^ Widows sometimes won employment for a younger son
in Ûie place of an injured brother or father so that the family in-
14. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 16-17, Muldowney v. Illinois Central Ry. Co.
15. David L. Lightner, Labor on the Illinois Central Railroad, 1852-1900: The Evolu-
tion of an Industrial Environment (New York, 1977), 128-29. The IC Relief Club
had failed by the time Edward Laughiin was injured in 1868. In fact, the IC
completely reversed its position on company-sponsored welfare schemes
during the remainder of the nineteenth century. In 1889, when the Interstate
Commerce Commission questioned railroad corporations about employee-
employer relatior\s, C. A. Beck, general manager of the IC, responded that the
company had no employee insurance fund. Moreover, their workers had to
depend on accommodations provided by the Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion rather than company-sponsored reading rooms or lodges. U.S. Interstate
Commerce Commission, "Relatior\s Existing Between Railway Corporations
and Their Employees, Third Annual Report . . ., 1889 (Washington, DC, 1890),
358 (hereafter cited as ICC, Report, 1889). For a celebratory history of the Rail-
road Y MC A, see John F. Moore, The Story of the Railroad "Y" (New York, 1930).
16. In 1856, for example, IC division superintendent James C. Clarke agreed to
pay the medical expenses of an injured brakeman who was "a poor boy with-
out friends or money." Lightner, Inhor on the Illinois Central Railroad, 124.
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come remained constant.^ ^ Company officers always stressed that
gratuities or favors did not indicate liability and that only faith-
ful employees would be compensated. For example, after three
of conductor F. Clark's toes froze while he cleared the Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy Railroad (CB&Q) tracks near Keokuk
during a severe snowstorm in 1885, Clark was off work for
eight weeks and lost $145.35 in wages. Assistant general man-
ager Heruy B. Stone argued that although the line paid "train-
men for taking chances of exposure to the weaüier," Clark
should be given seventy-five dollars. The superintendent of the
Iowa lines, W. F. Merrill, agreed, explaining that rewarding
Clark for meritorious service would inspire other employees. *'
Clark's "reward" amounted to half pay and did not include the
payment of doctor bills; its effect on morale is unknown.
Company benevolence came at a price. Men who wanted
aid usually had to waive their right to sue, and companies were
not above taking advantage of workers who did not under-
stand the waiver's contents. For example, E. B. Jessup's leg was
crushed in a coupling accident on the Chicago and North West-
em in 1884. After doctors amputated Jessup's foot, a company
officer promised him work as a fireman when he recovered.
Jessup then unwittingly signed a release, thinking that it was
merely a receipt for services provided by the company. When
Jessup later arrived in Eagle Grove, Iowa, to claim his promised
job, he w a^s told that there was no position available. Jessup
then sued, claiming that the company had reneged and insisting
that the excruciating pain of his injuries had made it impossible
for him to read the waiver. The trial transcript reveals, however,
that Jessup was illiterate even under the best of circumstances.
Jessup's case demonstrates not only that company representa-
tives sometimes duped workers into signing waivers, but also
that company promises were notoriously unreliable.'^
17. Ibid., 127.
18. W. F Merrill to Henry B. Stone, 30 April 1885, L. O. Goddard In-Letters:
Miscellaneous, 1882-1896, Gratuities, CBQ 3G5.3, Chicago, Burlington, and
Quincy Archives, Newberry Library, Chicago; Henry B. Stone to T. J. Potter, 4
May 1885, ibid.; O. E. Stewart to W. F Merrill, 27 April 1885, ibid.
19. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 1-3, Jessup v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
way Company, 82 Iowa 243 (1891).
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Edward Laughlin's family, therefore, faced a dilemma if
they hoped for aid from the IC. If Edward signed a waiver, he
and his family would have to rely on unpredictable corporate
charity. If he refused to sign, or signed and then attempted to
sue, all company aid would stop. Moreover, management re-
served its full legal wrath for men who exhibited "ingratitude"
and "disloyalty" by seeking to recover full wages and the costs
of medical treatment through the courts.
Of course, disabled workers did have other options, de-
pending on the extent of their injuries. If Laughlin's disability
had been less severe, he might have hoped (as E. B. Jessup did)
for job reassignment. Managers sometimes put disabled train-
men to work at the less demanding jobs of flagmen and watch-
men, jobs that able-bodied railroaders scorned. The CB&Q, for
example, reserved work on the Chariton branch for old and dis-
abled trainmen.^ Disabled men might also work in company-
established employee reading rooms. The Pennsylvania Rail-
road, for example, hired John Freed, an employee who had "lost
a leg in the service of the company," to supervise the library at
the company's railroad clubhouse in New York.^ ' Despite man-
agerial insistence that the comparées' actior\s should be under-
stood as acts of charity, workers continued to interpret gratuities
and job preferences as a matter of justice."
Laughlin, too seriously injured to merit reassignment, in-
itially accepted aid from the IC. The company continued to
pay his salary for six months after the accident, an unusually
generous stipend. Then the money stopped. Medical expenses
mounted; his medicine alone cost four hundred dollars, or as
20. O. H. Kirkpatrick, Working on the Railroad (Philadelphia, 1949), 117; Licht,
Working for the Railroad, 202; James H. Ducker, Men of the Steel Rails: Workers on
the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, 1869-1900 (Lincoln, NE, 1983), 44.
21. "A Railroad Club House," Locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 24 (1890),
634; Ducker, Men of the Steel Rails, 44-45.
22. Injured trainmen also relied on their coworkers to pass the hat. Such col-
lections for injured workers were known as "papers." All grades of employees,
including railroad officers, subscribed to the frequently circulating papers.
Some railroad officials recognized that their contributions could raise morale
while narrowing the social divide between workers and managers. For one
example, see James O. Fagan, The Autobiography of an Individualist (Boston,
1912), 134-35.
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Marks' Patent Artificial Limbs
WITH RUBBER HANDS AND FEET
Purchased by ihe
United Slates and nipy
Foreign Govern meo is,
the
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Concinental Steamboat Co.
Delaware, Lackawanoa & Western R. R.
Delaware & Hudsoa R. R.
Florida Railway & Navigation Co.
GalvestOD. Harrisburgb & San Antonio R. R.
Guatemala Central R. R, ÍD Central Ameno.
Uhigh Valley R. R,
Long Inland R. R.
London * Noiibwestern R, R. in Engla nd.
Manhattan Eleva'.ed R, R.
Metropolitans. S. Co.
New York & Northern K. R.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R.
Naw York & Harlem R, R.
Norfolk & Weaiem R. B,
Old Dominion S. S. Co.
Panama R. R. in South America.
Pennsylvania R. R.
Philadelphia & Reading R. R.
Are natural in action, noisless in motion anil Ihe mosl durable
in CODS I ruction. The accompanying engravings ace taken irom liie
and show that persons wearins one or two artlñt:ial limbs are
ablento engage in every occuDation in its fullest capacity.
Tbe engineer wearing an artificial leg, Iba conductor and bag-
gagemaster each wearing a pair of arli6cial legs with rubber (eet,
and Ihe tickel agent stamping tickets with an artificial arm, represent
3 few of tbe empioymenls engaged in by persons wearing legs and
limbs of Marks' Patents,
OVER 13,000 IN USE,
Scattered ia all parts of the world.
Eminent surgeons and competent judges
COTDmend the rubber foot and hand for tbeir
many advantages.
Ai every isdus.
t r i a l exhibition
w b e r e exhibited,
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HIGHEST •
- ftWftRDS.
A Treatise con-
taining 430 pages
with 160 illustra-
tions sent free.
also a formula
for taking meas-
u r e m e n t s by
which limbs can
I u Hiui:i)jDi3 a ri a n. n , bemadeandsent
Pitlsburg, Cincinoati, Cbicago 4 St. Louis R'y to all parts of
Red Star Line S. S. Co. the world with
Richmond & Danville R. R. fit guaranteed.
South Bound R. R.
St. Louis, Arkansas & Texas R. R,
Unbn Pacific System.
West jersey R. R.
And other transportai ion lines.
Add re»
/I. A. MARKS, 701 Broadway.
Nrw York City
BMTABLISHBD FORT* VBABS
With "artificial limbs," this advertisement implies, disabled trainmen
could return to work in various capacitif. The advertisement appeared in
the Railway Conductor 10 (1893), 28.
Courting Risk 37
much as he would have earned in eight months." Realizing that
he would never work again, Laughlin told his mother that the
railroad company should be made to pay. The family, pressed to
financial extremity, decided to sue.
GIVEN THE NUMEROUS OBSTACLES to winning a law- ^^- '
suit against a railroad company, Laughlin and his family prob-
ably carefully considered their options before suing. Indeed,
a recent study concludes that railroaders who brought claims
fared no better than those who depended on corporate largesse.
First, there was the cost of a suit to consider. Companies re-
tained scores of lawyers and could ride out appeals for twenty
years. On earnings of forty to fifty dollars per month, or more
likely on the family's accumulated savings, most workers sim-
ply could not afford to sue.^ ^
Once at trial, workers found that comparées escaped lia-
bility in a number of ways. Lawyers relied on the common-law
principle of implied contract, arguing that when trainmen
stepped on the job, they accepted all risks associated with their
employment, including potential negligence by a fellow em-
ployee." It was especially difficult for trainmen to argue that
they were unaware of certain risks, since everything they did
was dangerous. Companies also relied on the "fellow servant"
rule. Lawyers insisted that the railroad could not be held ac-
countable for the inept behavior of a man's coworkers. Based
on the appealing idea that all railroad employees occupied an
equivalent status despite differences in rank, salary, and social
status, the "fellow servant" rule denied the authority a manager
or supervisor exercised over his subordinates. This formidable
barrier to financial recovery was at least partly erected by em-
ployees themselves. For decades, American skilled workers had
declared themselves to be equal to their employers. They based
their demands for workplace control on appeals to republican
23. Laughlin earned fifty dollars per month as a baggage master and brake-
man. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 2, Mitldozimey v. Illinois Central Ry. Co.
24. Licht, Worbngfor the Railroad, 199-200.
25. Ibid., 197.
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ideology and their rights as citizen-workers.^^ Corporations ac-
ceded to worker demands for greater control when they gained
economic benefits from doing so, as in the case of safety and
liability; such a tacit agreement allowed them to throw all re-
sponsibility for injuries back on the workers themselves." Rail-
roads could thus argue, if the occasion called for it, that their
employees were competent, reliable workers who should have
been capable of evaluating and avoiding risk. The intelligent
man, the argument went, refused foolish orders. Courts sup-
ported the railroads in this view.
Trainmen recognized, however, that the rapid growth of
railroad corporations during the Gilded Age severely limited
one's intimate knowledge of a fellow employee's abilities. One
switchman remarked, 'Tt is utterly absurd to impute to a brake-
man on a train knowledge of the capacity or fitness of a train
dispatcher, and to imply that on entering service he is charge-
able with knowledge of such fitness or qualifications, when the
probabilities are that the train dispatcher is not even known to
him personally or by reputation."^* Even though the "fellow-
servant" rule originated when home-based production was the
norm and close personal relationships did govern relations be-
tween servants. Gilded Age courts still considered everyone
except the company president "fellow employees."
The contested definition of "fellow employee" became even
more significant when railroads prohibited common, yet dan-
gerous, practices. For example, company rules forbade brake-
men from coupling moving cars, even though yardmasters
condoned, even mandated, the practice. Thus, railroaders—
injured while working as they had been commanded to do—
26. See David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: The Experience cf Workers in the
United States with Democracy and the Free Marht during the Nineteenth Century
(Cambridge, 1993), 13-51; Bruce Laurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nine-
teenth-Century America (New York, 1989), 63-73; Sean Wilentz, Chants Demo-
cratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New
York, 1984), 61-103; Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early
American Republic (Cambridge, 1993).
27. See Witt, "The Transformation of Work."
28. Locomotive Firemen's Magazine 14 (1890), 993-94.
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might find that they had broken a little-regarded company rule
and so would not be compensated. Rulebooks were also useful
for proving contributory negligence. Railroad lawyers picked
through such publications to point out all the employee's errors.
Courts comn\only agreed that it was against company rules to
get injured, so injured men had obviously broken a rule.
Iowa railroaders enjoyed one of the most advantageous
legal settings in the nation, for in 1862 Iowa's legislature had
overturned the strict interpretation of the "fellow-servant" rule.^
Nonetheless, Iowa's trainmen still found it difficult to win
liability suits against the railroads. To succeed, a plaintiff had
to prove that his accident resulted from a railroad's failure to
practice ordinary care in maintairùng a safe workplace. Lawyers
often persuaded courts that a business as large as a railroad
could not take responsibility for every mismatched coupler,
missing grab-iron, or faulty ash pan. Instead, they suggested
that a competent, observant employee knew of these ordinary
occupational hazards and could avoid them.™
Finally, companies that felt crossed by "ungrateful" em-
ployees frequently resorted to some bold ploys to escape
charges of negligence. When brakeman Nelson Baldwin had his
arm crushed after only three days of work, the Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific argued that he was not actually an employee
at all! Although the district court quickly halted that line of
argument, the railroad later successfully appealed Baldwin's
award on those very grounds.^' In other cases, companies de-
29. Ucht, Working for the Railroad, 199; Emlin McClain, Statutes of Iowa Relating
to Railways, and Notes of Decisions Thereunder (Des Moines, 1891), 81.
30. An employee's knowledge diminished a company's liability. When a water
spout knocked brakeman Sydney S. Macey to his death (see n. 43 below), the
Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company successfully filed a motion for a
new trial by arguing, "The law is well settled that where an employee engages
or continues to work with or in the vicinity of dangerous machinery or struc-
tures, with a knowledge or means of knowledge of their unsafe and dangerous
condition, he thereby voluntarily incurs the risks incident to his employment
with the machinery or structures in such dangeroiis condition." Appellant's
Brief at [19], Greenleaf, v. Dubucjue & Sioux City Railroad Company, 33 Iowa 52
(1871).
31. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 17, Baldtvin v. C, R. I. & P. R. Co., 50 Iowa
680 (1879).
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nied that the broken men appearing before the court had even
sustained a disabling injury.'^ ^
When Edward Laughlin sued the IC, the line battled back
with all the legal weaporis in its arsenal. Unfortunately for
Laughlin, he did not live to defend himself against the counter-
charges of contributory negligence and incompetence. After
eight months of agony, he died. His mother, Anne Muldowney,
carried on the suit. The IC's defense team hired three doctors
to testify that the dead man's condition had never been life
threatening. They argued that Laughlin had caused his own
death by attempting to recover too quickly. As one doctor
stated, "His condition appeared very flattering and deceived
him."^^ The district court jury was sympathetic to the bereaved
—as they usually were in such cases—and awarded Laughlin's
estate ten thousand dollars. The IC immediately appealed to the
Iowa Supreme Court, arguing that their counterclaim of con-
tributory negligence had been ignored. Laughlin's family had
lost a son; now they stood to lose the liability suit as well.
LEGAL OBSTACLES were not the orüy barriers disabled train-
men faced in pursuing liability lawsuits. Such lawsuits also
pitted injured trainmen against their able-bodied peers in a
battle to determine who might claim to be a competent rail-
roader, a reliable comrade, and a true man. Trainmen in Iowa,
like men across the nation, tried to convince themselves that
their experience would enable them to avoid debilitating, even
lethal, accidents. They believed that they possessed skills that
their injured comrades could not match and had nerve that de-
serted men of weak character. Railroading work culture cele-
brated men who confronted risks coolly, skillfully, and bravely.
Men killed in the line of duty were heroes; men who sustained
injury but later returned to work were veterans. Disabled work-
ers, dependent on family care and unable to earn a living, how-
32. For example, when John Boyle's ankle got caught between the drawbars of
two construction cars and prevented him from working for a year, the Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company argued that his ankle "had
received nothing more than slight bruises." Appellant's Abstract of Record at
4, Boyle v. C, R.L&P. R. Co., 56 Iowa 765 (1881).
33. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 26, Muldovmey v. Illinois Central Ry. Co.
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ever, often found themselves ostracized from and criticized by
their former coworkers. Edward Laughlin's mother, Anne
Muldowney, for example, found that her son's fellow trainmen
refused to testify on his behalf. Coworkers often interpreted the
willingness to sue as prima facie evidence of a man's failure to
take responsibility for his own behavior; in seeking to blame
another party for his injury, the disabled man admitted that he
did not and could not exercise perfect control over his body, his
laboring environment, or his economic destiny. At a time when
men celebrated bodily self-control and economic independence
as critical aspects of working-class manhood, such an admission
left the physically disabled worker vulnerable to suspicions of
moral weakness.
Employers used their formidable powers of coercion to pro-
cure favorable defense testimony in liability suits, yet workers
themselves set the agenda for the type of testimony they deliv-
ered. Defense depositions reveal that trainmen embedded a dis-
cussion of character issues in their testimony on workplace
competence. By joining their employers in making occupational
disability a moral issue, able-bodied railroaders deluded them-
selves about their chances of injury and denied the worth and
manliness of the injured.
Trainmen's attitudes toward risk, competence, and disability
help to explain their testimony and their changing responses to
the safety problem. It is important to remember that in the 1870s
and 1880s most railroaders did not agitate for safety equipment
despite the rising casualty rates and the availability of such
equipment to their employers. Instead, they relied on their
ability to work safely in unsafe conditions. In part, the hiring
climate of the time allowed them to maintain a degree of non-
chalance. Even if they happened to be modestly injured on the
job, trainmen with a slight visible disability (such as a missing
finger) might return to work. Throughout this period, railroad-
ers and employers alike viewed a partial disability as a sign of
experience. A brakeman's first crushed finger, for example,
served as his "red badge of courage" and helped mark his
transition from greenhorn to experienced railroader. A man
such as "Bellaire the One-Eingered Eireman" continued to work
despite horrific injuries, admired by trainmen and managers
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Jos. }. Bellaire ("the One-Fingered Fireman") poses (standing, right) with three
other disabled trainmen. From the Railway Conductor 39 (1905), 837.
alike. Such a worker had met adversity with manly character
and had survived.^
Moreover, veteran railroaders viewed fearlessness and risk-
taking as a sure indication of professionalism. When asked to
explain how railroaders controlled their fear, a veteran yard-
master admitted, "Every man who starts in railroading has a
fear at the beginning. Sometimes it lasts a few weeks. Some-
times he is always afraid, no matter how many years he is on
the road. Such a man will never become a practical railroader,
though, even if he has forty years' experience." Crystal Eastman
concluded, after a careful assessment of railroaders' attitudes
34. Locomotive Firemen's Magazine 14 (1890), 129; Ducker, Men of the Steel Raib
55-56.
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toward risk, "Extreme caution is as unprofessional among the
men in dangerous trades as fear would be in a soldier."^
Trainmen's memoirs reveal that experienced workers dealt
with danger through recognition and confrontation rather than
through the avoidance of risk. O. H. Kirkpatrick explained,
"The very nature of the trainman's work was so hazardous that
it was orüy those who were disposed to take risks who got very
far in their career" He supported his claim by celebrating
Shorty, a brakeman and inveterate risk-taker. Shorty took riskS
"because he could no more control this desire than a sot can
control the desire for liquor." Kirkpatrick portrayed Shorty as
a genius brakeman, his risk-taking a sign of skill. "I saw him
perform hundreds of feats that required perfect timing, alerted
reflexes, and the speed of lightning—where the slightest error
in any particular would have ended in tragic death." Shorty's
fearlessness and quick reflexes led not to the grave, however,
but to promotion and a long career as a conductor.^ ^
For some railroaders, grappling with danger was the central
appeal of the work. Locomotive engineer Heruy Clay French
supported this most extreme view when he explained, "The
danger incident to the engineer's job was the only real incentive
to remain at it."^ ^ J. Harvey Reed glamorized his accidents and
near misses, cataloging his disasters in loving detail. For Reed,
his frequent accidents merely accentuated his marüiness. He
explained that railroading was "a life that brave men love, and
one that cowards cannot follow."^ *
In such a work climate, where many railroaders equated the
mastery of fear with marüiness, and risks successfully flaunted
with skill, veterans reserved special scom for workers who asked
35. Eastman, Work Accidents and the Law, 93-94.
36. Kirkpatrick, Working on the Railroad, 116, 63, 65, 67. Kirkpatrick's comments
are based on his observations as a railroader around the turn of the century.
37. Later, when working along the Union Pacific's route that followed the
Columbia River, French commented, "Buming bridges in the summer months,
falling rock during the winter and spring, gave this work an extra tang of dan-
ger that made it interesting." Chauncey Del French, Railroadman (New York,
1938), 116,137.
38. J. Harvey Reed, Forty Years a Locomotive Engineer: Thrilling Tales of the Rail
(Prescott,WA, 1912), 11.
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A brakeman sets a brake during a storm. When this print
appeared in Scribner's Monthly (November 1888), 549, it
was captioned "An Instance of Degeneration." Vfíien it was
reprinted in the Railway Conductor (August 1890), the
daring act was given the ironic caption "A Picnic. "
for safety appliances. Many railroaders believed that ir\sisting
on such equipment was a way of covering for one's lack of
bravery, manliness, and skills. When switchman Frank Pieart,
for example, requested that running boards be installed on a
yard engine at Atlantic, Iowa, the yardmaster "rather laughed,
and said that in other yards they didn't have running boards on
engines." Later that day, however, the lack of rurming boards
caused Pieart to be mortally wounded.^^
39. Appellant's Absh*act of Record at 8, Pieart v. Chicago, Rock Island & Padfic
Railway Company, 82 Iowa 148 (1891).
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Railroading work culture also connected risk taking to man-
liness through a defense of economic autonomy. Some trainmen
prized the risky work environraent as a means of preserving
their own job security. Veteran workers feared that safety de-
vices, such as automatic couplers, would simplify their work
and make it easier for replacements to take their jobs during
strikes." The new automatic couplers also eliminated some
common tactics used to disrupt the workplace during a strike.
Previously, strikers could cripple a yard by stealing all the
coupling pins used to link cars together. Strikers could also in-
timidate scabs by threatening to beat them with the long oaken
clubs brakemen carried to drive coupling pins into place. Be-
cause the new devices did not use pins, automatic couplers re-
moved railroaders' most immediate sources of redress/'
Liability suits that pitted full-time trairunen against part-
timers also revealed how veterans used common ideas about
risk and competence to besmirch the manly judgment of their
injured "temporary" peers. Andrew Reed, for example, worked
mostly as a molder in Davenport, Des Moines, Pella, Oskaloosa,
and Knoxville. When he could not find molding work, however,
he picked up odd jobs in a brickyard or on the rails. In 1879
two cars crushed Reed's hand while he worked as a temporary
brakeman. In his subsequent suit against the Chicago, Rock
Island, and Pacific Railroad, Reed argued that the fireman,
George Dana, had moved the locomotive before Reed had given
the signal to proceed; Reed's hand was crushed because he had
not expected the train to move. Despite Reed's seven years of
intermittent experience, the rest of the crew testified to Reed's
ignorance of rail operations. Dana claimed that Reed had in-
deed given him the signal to come ahead, implying that no one
who knew how locomotives reacted after striking a car would
have been surprised or injured. When Reed argued that the
drawbars he had been coupling were irregular, the hind brake-
man, who made the coupling after Reed was hurt, disputed
40. This had actually happened on the New York Central, where, during a
strike, rolling stock equipped with automatic couplers were "found to be a
great help to the new employees in handling cars." Locomotive Engineers'
Monthly Journal 24 (1890), 877-78.
41. Ibid., 878.
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him." The rest of the train crew viewed Reed as an interloper, an
impression Reed reinforced when he blamed Dana for the acci-
dent rather than living up to the railroad code of manliness and
taking responsibility for his own safety
Defense testimonies in Edward Laughlin's lawsuit also ex-
emplify these attitudes toward work, risk, and injury. The IC
claimed that Laughlin's own incompetence caused his injury;
his fellow workers agreed. Brakeman E. P. Lovejoy testified that
he "thought the cars were coming too fast to make the coupling
with safety." If Lovejoy had recognized the danger, why hadn't
Laughlin? The conductor of the train suggested that experi-
enced railroaders knew that the bumpers might misalign. Fi-
nally, the engineer of the train, with eighteen years on the rails,
reaffirmed Laughlin's incompetence when he commented, "I
have never saw such a coupling attempted since I have been
railroading, w h^en the cars w e^re running as fast as those . . .
Laughlin attempted to couple." Laughlin's judgment, like his
skill, had been wanting.'*^ On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court
reversed the district court ruling in Laughlin's case because the
jury had been too willing to overlook Laughlin's supposed con-
tributory negligence.
42. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 3-9, Reed v. C, R. I. & R R. Co., 57 Iowa 23
(1881).
43. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 14, 21, and 23, Muldozvney v. ¡Uinois Cen-
tral Ry Co. This type of testimony was common. For example, when the water
tank spout at Ackiey—the same station where Laughlin met his fate—knocked
brakeman Sidney Macey to his death, workers avowed that Macey's incom-
petence (rather than the unsafe conditions in which he worked) brought
about his downfall. Baggage master and former brakeman Stephen Bonner,
bragging about his own skills, explained, "1 have done the same thing that
Macey was doing when he was killed a hundred times over, but I always got
clear to the side of the cars and avoided the spout." Appellant's Brief at [8],
Greenleafv. Dubuque &• Sioux City Railroad Company. Of course, some trainmen
may have judged their injured comrades as incompetent for more selfish rea-
sons. The locomotive engineer driving the train on which Nelson Baldwin was
working concluded, "He could not have a more favorable opportunity to cou-
ple cars than he had at [the time of the accident], and the Injury or accident
could not have happened to him . . . if he had understood his business." The
engineer refused to consider that he might have contributed to Baldwin's in-
jury by improper operation of the switching engine. Appellant's Abstract of
Record at 19, Baldwin v. C, R. I. &• P. R. Co.
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SOME TRAINMEN grudgingly admitted that there were limits
to a man's ability to protect himself. When they attempted to
purchase irisurance policies as individuals, however, they were
refused. One engineer explained, "I did not receive a policy,
simply because I was a Locomotive Engineer, which they dassed
as 'extra hazardous.'"** In response to such discrimination,
groups of railroaders formed mutual aid societies or fraternal
orders. Such organizations, called brotherhoods, provided eco- */7-5A
nomic security for members and their dependents when their
skills were not enough to compensate for the risks of their pro-
fession.*^ The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) es- ^7-5:1
tablished the first brotherhood insurance association in 1867. Its
fund paid members for the loss of a hand, foot, or limb, or total
blindness; survivors received death benefits. The Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen originated as a benevolent insurance
association, although disability insurance constituted a separate
policy. The Order of Railroad Conductors established an in-
surance fund in 1882; the Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen
quickly followed suit in 1884. The Switchmen's Mutual Aid As-
sociation of North America established a locally admirustered
guaranty fund for its members in 1886. Some brotherhood locals
also ran their own benevolent funds and helped disabled mem-
bers by providing food and paying doctor bills.*^
As time progressed, the brotherhoods expanded their pur-
pose and took on some of the characteristics of uruons, includ-
ing limited efforts to bargain collectively with employers for
higher wages and better conditions. Not surprisingly, given the
average trainman's attitudes, brotherhoods considered the certi-
fication of competence, manliness, and safety as their biggest
bargairúng tools. The BLE, for example, sought to prevent acci-
dents, certify member competence, and ir\still marily behavior.
44. J. C. E to BLE, Chicago, 11 May 1868, Locomotive Engineers' Monthly journal 2
(1868), 164, quoted in Reed C. Richardson, The Locomotive Engineer, ÏS63-J963.-
A Century of Railway Labor Relations and YJork Rules (Ann Arbor, MI, 1963), 132.
45. The following railroad brotherhoods were formed in rapid succession; the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (1863); the Order of Railway Conduc-
tors (1868); the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen (1873); the Brotherhood of
Railroad Brakemen (1883); and the Switchmen's Mutual Association (1886).
46. ICC, Report, 1889, 387-90.
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BLE leaders used a variety of journal articles, letters, and poems
to promote a model of marüy behavior based on the motto of
the organization: "Sobriety, Trutli, Justice, and Morality."'" Rail-
road comparées, the BLE hoped, would recognize the superior
character of member engineers and hire them exclusively. All of
the brotherhoods promoted safety, manly character, and eco-
nomic security as part of a single trade identity, although they
differed widely in their conceptions of ideal relations between
workers and management.
Although only a portion of Iowa's trainmen belonged to the
brotherhoods at any given time, these societies influenced the
character of labor-management relations in the state. A brief ex-
amination of these organizations, focusing on the BLE, suggests
the ways the railroad brotherhoods both reflected worker ide-
ologies and crystallized ideas concerning competence, profes-
sionalism, and safety into a coherent argument for increased
power in labor negotiations.
The BLE, like other brotherhoods, attempted to enforce high
standards of behavior to ensure that their members impressed
company officers.** From its inception, therefore, the BLE in-
sisted that the true railroad professional was moral, intelligent,
competent, and temperate. The membership qualifications for
the BLE stressed these attributes: "No man can become a mem-
ber of the brotherhood unless he is twenty-one years of age, has
had one year's experience as a locomotive engineer, is of good
moral character and temperate habits, and can read and write."
Engineers could only be promoted due to "merit and ability,"
47. See, for example Locomotive Engineers' Monthly loumal 4 (1870), 198, 215;
ibid. 18 (1884), 338-40; ibid. 20 (1886), 706-8; ibid. 26 (1892), 423-24; and ibid.
33 (1899), 776.
48. Indeed, officers such as Charles Hine of the Burlington commented that "to
be respected [the brotherhoods] must purge their ranks of the morally unfit.
The union must expel the thief and Üie ruffian, if justly discharged by the
company, before it can hope to be trusted as a judge of capacity." Charles
DeLano Hine, Letters from an Old Railway Official to His Son, a Division Superin-
tendent (Chicago, 1904), 166.
49. ICC, Report, 1889, 387. A less noble membership qualification was that of
race. In 1867 the BLE officially excluded AJrican Americans from membership
in the brotherhood. Philip S. Foner, History of the labor Movement in the United
States, 2d ed., 10 vols. (New York, 1975), 2:248.
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with the length of service varying "depending to a great extent
on the character of the man." BLE leaders took credit for rid-
ding the profession of riff-raff, claiming that "the brotherhood
has been instrumental in giving the railway companies a better
class of men than they would otherwise have had. . . . When-
ever a man is detected dissipating, he is punished and the offi-
cers of the road notified of the same."^
Throughout the Gilded Age, brotherhoods attempted to in-
crease their bargaining power by convincing the public that
only brotherhood members possessed the skills to avoid acci-
dents. During the 1888 Burlington strike, for example, when the
CB&Q replaced striking BLE members with scabs, the strike
committee warned passengers about unsafe conditions on "The
Great American Scab Route." Their broadside cautioned that
"a railroad like the CB&Q cannot run with threshing machine
engineers and vagrants and drunkards in the places of their old
reliable engineers and firemen" (see illustration, following page).
By accusing scabs of insobriety, inexperience, and incompetence,
BLE leaders built upon the widespread belief that steadiness,
safety, and competence were solely the province of the true rail-
roader—a status that only brotherhood men could claim.
The BLH and other railroad brotherhoods did more than
simply capitalize on preexisting ideologies of railroad manhood.
Through their monthly publications, Üiey also hoped to trans-
form their members' habits and shape their tastes. For example,
one could easily mistake the early volumes of the BLE's monthly
journal for a temperance society publication, even though many
members continued to enjoy drinking at the trackside saloon. ^
Brotherhood journals also occasionally downplayed sectarian,
partisan, and sectional differences to present a urùfied organ-
izational front.
50. ICC, Report, 1SS9, 387.
51. For an examination of the relationship between saloon culture and the
working class, see Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and
Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920 (Cambridge, 1983), 34-64. Alcohol was a
persistent problem on nineteenth-century railroads. Paul V Black found that
between 1877 and 1892, alcohol played a role in over 29 percent of all em-
ployee discharges on the CB&Q. Paul V. Black, "Experiment in Bureaucratic
Centralization: Employee Blacklisting on the Burlington Railroad, 1877-1892,"
Business History Review 51 (1977), 451.
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TAKE THE GREAT AMERICAN
SCAB ROUTE
Close Connections with the Hereafter
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Strikers' broadside, 1888, courtesy of Chicago Historical Society.
Yet there were some principles upon which all members
apparently agreed. For example, brotherhood members har-
bored harsh attitudes toward the unemployed, whom they
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viewed as probable incompetents as well as potential com-
petitors. An article in the BLE's Monthly Journal criticized im-
employed mechanics. "Mechanics out of work are generally
men who are not the best in their line. . . . The slovenly, slow,
inefficient, negligent and unintelligent workman is the one who
always marches first when reduction in force is necessary, and it
is he whom we hear most often prating in the grog-shops about
the oppression of capital and the tyranny of employers.""
Among the most serious issues confronting the railroad bro-
therhoods, of course, was how best to address the physical and
financial woes of disabled members in a way that upheld their
ideals about competence and manliness. BLE members rea-
soned that their insurance fund, far from rewarding incompe-
tence, allowed men to act heroically. N. W. Holbrook explained
that joining the plan was "a duty that we owe the public . . . to
relieve ourselves of [financial] responsibility, so that in time of
danger we can stand manfully to our station, and sacrifice our
lives, if necessary, knowing that upwards of seven thousand
brothers stand ready to relieve the wants of our families."" Not
all members conceded the need for ii\surance, but those who did
subscribe saw it as an aid to manliness rather than as a crutch
for the unskilled. Most also drew a sharp distinction between
insurance benefits and charity. Insurance policies represented a
prudent investment in continued independence should the un-
thinkable occur; charity was the last recourse of the improvident.
Yet one of the foundational precepts of the brotherhoods
was charity. Certain locals prided themselves on extending a
helping hand to the families of the killed and injured men who
had not joined the insurance program. Men found it far more
palatable to aid widows and orphans, however, than they did
their own comrades. Some members interpreted the lack of
fiscal foresight (failure to provide for contingent emergencies
through insuring oneself) as an indication of failed manliness
on the part of the uninsured disabled; they demanded to know
why they should behave charitably towards men who had
shirked one of the fundamental duties of a husband and father."
52. locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 24 (1890), 591.
53. Ibid. 4 (1870), 83.
54. See, for example, ibid. 34 (1900), 294.
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Moreover, brotherhood members believed that the power
they exerted in the labor-capital relationship depended on their
ability to convince railroad companies that members were com-
petent, safe men. If their self-conceptions were correct, brother-
hood members were the prize specimens of railroad manhood
and should have been able to negotiate risks successfully. Yet
some clearly had not triumphed over danger. How could the
brotherhoods continue to claim the competence of its member-
ship under such circumstances? Most chose to blame the indi-
vidual worker rather than forfeit the politically powerful con-
nected claims of competence, marUiness, and safety. Sharing the
sentiments of most trairunen, members often judged their dis-
abled comrades as lacking in virtue as well as skill. Those who
would compound their errors by asking for charity were double
failures: responsible for their injuries due to incompetence, in-
experience, or intemperance and responsible for their poverty
due to lack of foresight. Members were loath to provide charity
to "unworthy" characters who would surrender their dignity
and independence rather than insure themselves. Widespread
charitable imtiatives, like any systematic demands for safety
reform, foundered on the shoals of contempt for the disabled.
Although fraternally bound to each other, brotherhood men
continued to shoulder the burdens of risk alone.
BY THE FINAL DECADE of the nineteenth century, however,
trainmen faced changing conditions in the workplace that
forced them to reexamine their attitudes towards masculiruty,
disability, and safety Previous understandings between workers
and employers broke down as corporations rationalized their
bureaucracies, pursued greater efficiencies, and established sci-
entific management policies. In Iowa and nationally, hard times
and higher injury rates compelled railroad officers and train-
men to confiront the sobering realities of occupational disability
head-on.
Worker anxieties mounted as hiring opporturùties dimin-
ished. By the end of the 1880s, most railroads refused to hire
even slightly disabled trainmen. Companies manifested an in-
creased mania for efficiency and feared that disabled trainmen
would work too slowly and would be more susceptible to injury.
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Spectacular train wrecks commanded public attention in the late nine-
teenth century. They may fmve been one reason hiring opportunities for
disabled railroad workers diminished at the end of the century, as man-
agers came to believe that hiring disabled trainmen made passengers
nervous. This photo captures the wreckage of a Chicago, Kansas, and Ne-
braska train near Washington, Iowa, ca. 1891. Photo courtesy State His-
torical Society of Iowa, Iowa City.
Managers also believed that employing men with disabilities
made passengers nervous. The image of railroader as risk-taker
was firmly fixed in the public mind, and some riders perceived
that disabled men lacked either nerve or prudence. Finally, L. L.
Losey, chief claim agent of the IC, explained that by rejecting
disabled men, lines protected themselves "against fraudulent
claims for pre-existing injuries v hich otherwise might be charged
to an accident while in service."^^
The Chicago and North Western typified the trend to dis-
criminate against men with disabilifies when it refused to give
55. L. L. Losey, "The ReliHons between the Surgical and Claims Departments
of Railroads," pamphlt. reprinted from the Railway Surgical loumal (March
1908), 3, Newspaper Clippings, 1899-1915, IC 2.9 v. 18, Illinois Central Ar-
chives, Newberry Library; Ducker, Men of the Steel Raib, 121-22.
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E. B. Jessup the job he had been promised. The officer in charge
of Jessup's case explained that he was "determined not to put
any more cripples on the engines. " The case report noted that
the officer "says he has one cripple in here and he don't want
any more. He has trouble with cripples on an engine." Jessup,
like many disabled Iowa trainmen, was then forced into a less
lucrative job. Andrew Reed, who found it impossible to return
to his primary occupation as a molder after his coupling acci-
dent, ultimately found that he was incapable of earning a living
at any type of manual labor. Nelson Baldwin tried to become
a dgarmaker. His crushed arm, however, prevented him from
keeping pace, and he soon found himself waiting tables. After
struggling with jobs that demanded arm strength and dexterity,
Baldwin decided his useful work-life was over. Each man, in an
earlier time, might have gotten a less taxing job on the railroad.
Conditions had changed, however. Each man decided to sue
rather than to succumb without a fight to the downward spiral
In an effort to reduce expenditures and evade liability in the
face of such lawsuits, railroad companies began to set up relief
departments, surgical departments, and claim departments in
the 1880s.^ ^ Despite the appearance of corporate benevolence,
employees contributed most of the funds for these endeavors.
Moreover, workers were required to join the "voluntary" fund
or be fired. Workers quickly came to resent the relief funds.
Mandatory enrollment denied trainmen the opportunity to
make independent choices about how best to protect them-
selves and their families from risk. Some men rejected the idea
that they needed insurance at all. Moreover, organized workers
rightly suspected that relief funds had been designed as a cor-
56. Appellant's Abstract of Record at 3, Jessup v. Chicago & Northwestem Rail-
way Company; Appellant's Abstract of Record at 3, Reed v. C, R. I. & P. R. Co.)
Appellant's Abstract of Record at 12-13, Baîdïmn v. C, R.L&P. R. Co.
57. Aside from the Illinois Central's short-lived "IC Relief Club," the first com-
panies to set up voluntary relief departments were the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad in 1880 and the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1886. Hazlett and Hummel,
Industrial Medicine, 38-39; Licht, Working for the Railroad, 210. The CB&Q set
up its relief fund in 1889. See J. C. Welling to Stuyvesant Fish, 6 February
1896, Bundle of Letters Concerning Prospective Relief Department, 1896, IC
3.4, box 6, Illinois Central Archives.
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porate ploy to dimirüsh the lure of the railroad brotherhoods,
which offered insurance as a membership benefit. Edward
O'Shea, an officer of the Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen,
bitterly summarized the prevailing brotherhood view.
Some of the principal lines have lately organized so-called "relief
associations" for the ostensible purpose of "caring for our dear
employes," but the real purpose is to undermine and ultimately
destroy the brotherhood and place the men entirely at the mercy
of the corporations. The brakeman does not receive wages com-
mensurate with the work he performs or the dangers he is com-
pelled to undergo; hence, he is unable to keep up his membership
in more than one organization. . . . A protest will result in a dis-
charge, and a discharge forfeits all moneys paid into the fund. The
relief fund is a delusion and a snare, and many of the brakemen
CO
know it from bitter experience.
Finally, railroaders soon learned that they were even less
likely to secure compensation through the relief funds than
through litigation. Railroad surgeons, hired by the company, ^ "^  '
played a pivotal role in railroad companies' efforts to avoid li- ^w /
ability. They had sole discretion to decide whether a company c^ r^ *^
would compensate an injured employee. The railroad surgeon's í^ TI^ '^ v^
first duty was to determine whether injured employees were '
entitled to relief funds. Caring for injured men was of secondary
importance. CB&Q surgeons were instructed to interrogate
injured employees as soon as they arrived for care, because "a
person will then usually give a more truthful and explicit
statement than [after meeting with] sympathizing or designing
friends."^' Moreover, men who applied for relief funds first had
to release the company from any legal liability, foreclosing the
possibility of disputing the surgeon's decision before a court of
law. Workers thus legitimately suspected that escaping liability
had been the primary reason that companies established vol-
untary relief departments."
In 1883 C. E. Perkins, vice president of the CB&Q, wrote a
long memorandum concerning the CB&Q surgical department.
58. ICC, Report, 1889,388-89.
59. Losey, "Relations between Surgical and Claims Departments," 3.
60. See Eastman, Work Accidents and tlie Law, 195-206.
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Humanitarian concerns were far down his list of reasons for
establishing such a department. Perkins's primary concern was
to ensure that the line had "precise knowledge as to the extent
and character of personal injuries." Perkins believed that the
company could limit liability claims by deciding what consti-
tuted an injury. He ir\sisted that "no surgeon except those ap-
pointed by the Company . . . shall be called by any employee to
attend cases of personal injury"''' Employees who wanted the
company to pay for any of their medical care were thus denied
the right to a second opinion. Without contrary testimony from
another physician outside of the railroad's employ, liability
cases could not succeed.
When company surgeons did place worker welfare before
financial considerations, companies quickly disavowed their
decisions. In 1887 the Iowa Supreme Court supported the com-
pany view, ruling that railway surgeons had no authority to
bind a company to pay for an injured employee's care, even if the
care was recommended by the company's surgeon." In Iowa,
then, railway surgeons were hired primarily to protect company
finances, and the practice had the backing of Iowa law.
Railroads also explored the possibilities of establishing com-
pany hospitals to limit employee injury claims and inspire em-
ployee loyalty. In 1880 C. E. Perkins wrote to A. N. Towne,
general superintendent of the Central Pacific, to inquire about
that line's hospital system. Towne assured Perkins that com-
pany hospitals were an affordable way to reduce liability and
instill corporate loyalty. Apparently, however, many trainmen
objected to the mandatory fifty-cent monthly fee deducted
from workers' salaries for Üie privilege of receiving emergency
medical care, for Towne admitted that "inconsiderate, bad men"
sometimes caused problems for the company by demanding
their full wage packet. He assured Perkins that such trouble-
makers "were not given a second opportunity [to object to the
wage deduction], being summarily dismissed." Railroad offi-
61. C. E. Perkins, "Memorandum: Surgical Department," 11 December 1883,
C. E. Perkins In-Letters, July-December 1883, CBQ 3 P6.36, CB&Q Archives.
62. Bushneil v. Chicago & Northwestem Ry. Co., 69 Iowa 620 (1886); Iowa Board
of Railroad Commissioners, Tenth Annual Report.. .for the Year Ending June 30,
1887 (Des Moines, 1888), 819 (hereafter dted as IBRC, Report, [year]).
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cials quickly perceived the value of hospitals that were fi-
nanced through mandatory employee contributions yet com-
pletely controlled by company officers and railway surgeons."
The IC was slow to open hospitals, hire surgeons, or de-
velop insurance funds.*^ Instead, it chose to reduce costs by
centralizing accident claims processing. Gratuity applications
were handled on a case-by-case basis in the 1860s and 1870s.
By the mid-1880s, the sheer volume of occupational disability
cases and the potential costs of such cases forced companies
to reconsider the personal approach to accident settlements.
Many rail lines set up personal injury claim departments
within their legal departments. Lawyers and claim agents ne-
gotiated out-of-court settlements, retained and supervised com-
pany lawyers, kept track of expenditures, and policed fraudu-
lent claims.^ ^
The increased rationalization undoubtedly saved companies
money; it also marked a significant departure from previous
63. A. N. Towne to C. E. Perkins, 30 January 1880, Papers Concerning Em-
ployees, 1877-1898, CBQ 33 1870 3.6, folder 1, CB&Q Archives. Although the
CB&Q discussed opening hospitals, it did not set one up in Iowa during this
period. Aside from the Atdiison, Topeka and Sante Fe hospital at Fort Madison,
railroad workers did not have access to company-sponsored hospitals in Iowa
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. U.S. Department of
Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Benevolent Institutions, 1904
(Washington, DC, 1905), 148-49; ibid., 3910 (Washington, DC, 1913), 288-89.
64. When the IC acquired the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern in 1896, it
inherited hospital facilities at Paducah, Kentucky. As late as 1910, however,
that was the only hospital it operated. John F. Stover, History of the Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad (New York, 1975), 230; U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor,
Bureau of the Census, Benevolent Institutions, 1910 (Washington, DC, 1913),
288-89. The IC made the Railway Officials and Employees' Accident Associa-
tion of Indianapolis the official private insurer of the IC in 1898. For the pro-
tracted discussions leading to the establishment of the corporate insurance
plan, see J. C. Welling to Stuyvesant Fish, 6 February 1896; Lightner, Labor on
the Illinois Central Railroad, 377. On the IC's insufficient attempts to establish a
relief department during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, see
also ibid., 269-74.
65. See Report of Cases Pending in Illinois and Iowa, in Minutes of Meeting of
Board of Directors, 1887, microfilm reel 9.351, IC Archives; Annual Report of
General Solicitor of Illinois Central Railroad as of December 1, 1888, in Min-
utes of Meefing of Board of Directors, 1888-1889, microfilm reel 9.352, ibid.;
and James Kells, "Exposes Fake Injury Claims," Newspaper Clippings, 1899-
1915, IC 2.9 V. 18, ibid.
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underlying ideas about disability. Personal involvement with or
knowledge of the circumstances of one's employees, to the ex-
tent that company officers had been involved in diagnosing the
moral dimension of worker injuries, was increasingly replaced
by purely financial considerations. Agents (like other insurers)
began to behave as though a lost arm, like a broken lever, had a
consistent and knowable "replacement" price. W. R. Head, the
IC's "personal injury agent," aptly reflected the increasingly
callous athtude of professional claims agents when he down-
played both the sufferings of the injured and the seriousness of
corporate negligence; in his view, "all great undertakings [were]
attended with their peculiar accidents.""
What effect did the existence of claims departments have on
the settlement of disability cases in Iowa? In the personal injury
and fatality cases disposed of by the IC during Üie early 1890s,
the corporation successfully used its agents to induce employ-
ees or èieir administrators to settle for far less than their inifial
claims. In 1889, at Webster County District Court in Fort Dodge,
Iowa, Peter Roy sued the IC for twelve thousand dollars for the
death of brakeman Albinus Roy. A year later, Peter Roy settled
for only five himdred dollars, or 4.2 percent of the original dam-
ages sought. In 1891 Mary Stewart settled for eight hundred
dollars, or 5.3 percent of her original fifteen-thousand-dollar
suit; her husband, brakeman A. J. Stewart, had died in a coupling
accident two years earlier. Nelly Lumley tried to recover $4,980
for the death of her husband, brakeman Edward R. Lumley, but
finally settled for $305. Between 1890 and 1893, the IC settled
nine cases; half of the lifigants received less than 6 percent of
their original claims.^ ^ Many widows were elated to win in dis-
trict court, only to learn from claims agents that the appeals pro-
cess could drag on for years. Agents were quick to remind the
bereaved that even if administrators won in the state supreme
court, their lawyers might wind up with more than half of any
eventual award. Exhausted economically and emotionally, a fciir
66. W. R. Head to James Fentress, 12 November 1892, IC 3.4, box 5, IC Archives.
67. Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, 1890, microfilm reel 9.354, IC
Archives; Reports of the General Solicitor, 30 June 1891 and 19 November 1892,
in Injury Reports, 1891 and 1893, IC 3.4, box 5, ibid..
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number of women decided {at the urging of company agents) to
take what they could get in an out-of-court settlement.**
Injured employees on the IC received somewhat larger set-
tlements than ¿hose who died, perhaps because injured victims
were more likely to pursue litigation to the bitter end than the
families of fatalities. E H. Knott, a fireman on the IC-controUed
Cherokee and Dakota Railroad Company, was injured when he
fell into a coal tender. In October 1889 he sued the railroad for
twenty-five thousand dollars. When the Lyons County EHstrict
Court awarded him rune thousand dollars, the IC appealed.
After three years of legal wrangling, Knott triumphed in the
state supreme court, receiving 40 percent of his initial request
for damages."
Thus, by the early 1890s, changing conditions had ren-
dered workers increasingly vulnerable. When railroad compa-
nies refused to hire even slightly impaired men, traiiunen be-
gan to fear that the smallest injury might spell the end of their
career. This was only one aspect, however, of a contradictory
course that challenged previous shared understandings about
the worker as an agent of his own economic and physical des-
tiny. Lines began to mount systematic attacks on worker con-
trol, removing critical decisions concerning health and safety
from the realm of the trainman's individual judgment. Com-
panies further signaled their retreat from the older under-
standings of disability when they rationalized systems of cor-
porate relief for the injured; companies increasingly preferred
to think of injured workers not as individuals but as a predict-
able cost of business. Broken trainmen, like broken machines,
would occasionally need new parts for which a railroad might
budget. It was cheaper by far to invest in new workers than in
safety equipment, and rail lines proceeded accordingly. At the
same time, however, corporations also attempted to evade or
68, See correspondence regarding Mrs. Hinzeman, Mrs. Carroll, Mrs. Jacobson,
and Mrs. Chase, Gratuities, L. O. Goddard In-Letters, Miscellaneous, 1882-
1896, CBQ 3 G5.3, CB&Q Archives.
69. Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, 1890, microfilm reel 9.354, !C
Archives; Reports of the General Solicitor, 30 June 1891 and 19 November 1892,
in Injury Reports, 1891 and 1893, IC 3.4, box 5, ibid.; Minutes of Meeting of
Board of EJirectors, 1889-1890, microfilm reel 9.353, ibid.
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diminish their liability by claiming that trainmen were still re-
spor\sible for the consequences of poor individual decisions.
Finally, companies still hoped to preserve their individual re-
lations with workers when it came to matters of hiring, firing,
and negotiating—they disliked railroad brotherhoods and at-
tempted to erode worker solidarity by manipulating company-
sponsored insurance plaris. Trainmen quickly recognized the
conundrum. On one hand, corporations denied their individu-
ality when it served company interests; on the other, compa-
nies attempted to take advantage of their individual weak-
nesses. Railroaders interpreted the contradictory practices—
which derued them control, increased their risk, and provided
little in return—as an assault on their prerogatives as workers
and as men. As they reconsidered their relationship with capi-
tal, trainmen also would be forced to rethink their position on
disability.
RAILROAD WORKERS and their brotherhoods would not
be alone in reconsidering safety conditions on Iowa's railroads,
however. Iowa's legislature began to take notice of railroad in-
juries and deaths in 1878, when it created the Board of Rail-
road Commissioners, The commission, consisting of three mem-
bers appointed by the govemor, primarily concerned itself
with straightening out squabbles over shipping rates, but it
also compiled yearly reports concerning railroad business in the
state. Each year, that report amassed state accident statistics.
As the casualties mounted throughout the 1880s and 1890s,
safety advocates began to plead for legislative action.
Iowa's railroad injury and death statistics provide a state-
wide snapshot of a national problem. In 1878, the first year of
data collection, 1 percent of Iowa's 13,518 railroad workers sus-
tained an injury.™ For the next twenty-five years, yearly injury-
totals ranged from 0.7 to 2.9 percent. The commissioners were
especially concerned with coupling accidents, which caused
more than half of all reported injuries during the late 1870s and
early 1880s. In their 1882 report, the commissioners commented.
70. These, as well as the following numbers, are derived from the annual re-
ports of the Iowa Board of Railroad Commissioners, 1878-1905.
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This drawing of a trainman coupling cars accompanied an article titled
"The Brakeman's CImnces" in the Railway Conductor 7 (15 July 1890).
According to the article, "The danger of sudden accidental death or maim-
ing" from coupling accidents is "practically unavoidable because, although
the necessary manipulations can be made without going between the cars
or placing the hands in dangerous situations, the men as a general thing
prefer to take the risk of the more dangerous method." Regulations re-
quired brakemen to use a stick, but, the "average brakeman" disregarded
the regulation, "partly because of fear of the ridicule that would be called
out by the exhibition of a lack of dexterity." The result was often mangled
hands. Of course, even if that part of the operation was a success, the train-
man faced even "worse danger in the possibility of being crushed bodily. "
"There is evidently something wrong in the entire arrangement
of coupling cars, for in no legitimate business should there be
such a liability to injury and death. We are not able to suggest a
remedy, but believe that something might be provided that
would do away with much of this." ^  Two years later, the com-
71. IBRC, Report, 1882 (Des Moines, 1882), 21.
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missioners mere prepared to offer a remedy. They strongly backed
the actions of the Massachusetts General Assembly, which had
just passed an act that made railroad companies operating in
Massachusetts place safety or automatic couplers on new and
newly repaired rolling stock. Iowa's railroad commissioners
remarked, "We look for the action of Massachusetts to be fol-
lowed everywhere, either by the voluntary act of the railway
companies or by legislative enactment, until the appalling list of
killed and injured from this cause shall belong to the past."^
The commission's collective indignation and enthusiasm for
state regulation of private industry did not last. In subsequent
years, the commission as a whole would be unwilling to rec-
7" ommend mandatory safety reguiatior\s."
Instead of demanding legislation to force railroad compa-
nies to ir\stall life-saving equipment, the commissioners tried to
mitigate public concern by stating that Iowa was doing a better
job of preventing injuries than most states. One annual report
claimed—with absolutely no statistical evidence to support the
contention—that when comparing the frequency of accidents
with railroad mileage, "Iowa was below the general average."^*
A closer examination of the commission's numbers, however,
indicates that they vastly underestimated the number of injuries
and deaths among Iowa's railroaders. By including employees
who were seldom exposed to danger, such as general officers,
general office clerks, and station agents, the comnüssion re-
duced the perceived effects of injury by inflating the reported
number of employees they considered at risk. When at-risk em-
ployees such as enginemen, firemen, conductors, brakemen,
trackmen, and switchmen are considered separately, railroading
accident statistics become even more alarming."
72. IBRC, Report, 1884 (Des Moines, 1885), 41.
73. In 1887, when Lorenzo S. Coffin produced a report in favor of mandatory
legislation, the rest of the members "thought best that he alone should be re-
sponsible for it." IBRC, Report, 1887 (Des Moines, 1888), 59.
74. Ibid., 39.
75. Although the commission did not record specific categories of railroad
employees before the mid-1890s, it is still possible to approximate the percent-
age of trairunen in Iowa. From 1895 to 1898 these workers made up 45 to 47
percent of the railroad employees in Iowa. By taking 46 percent of the earlier
numbers of total railroad employees, I have estimated how many employees
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Lumping all workers together, as the commissioners did,
the safest year during the 1880s was 1880, during which they
concluded that 0.2 percent of railroad workers were killed and
0.7 percent were injured. Disregarding track workers and office
workers, however, 0.8 percent of at-risk employees died during
the year, while 2.9 percent were injured. In 1882, the worst year
of the 1880s, the commissioners calculated that 0.5 percent were
killed and 2.9 percent received injury. Removing office workers
and track workers reveals a far riskier occupation. A stunning
2.1 percent of at-risk employees died and 11.6 percent were in-
jured in accidents (see table).
These adjusted accident statisfics help to explain the na-
tional outcry for railroad safety appliances in the early 1890s.
When congressman Henry Cabot Lodge compared the mortal-
ity rates of railroad workers and soldiers, he examined national
statisücs conceming the number of trairunen who died or were
injured in the line of duty during 1889. Lodge's statisfics more
closely resemble the percentage of railroad employees killed
and injured in Iowa during 1889 when office clerks and track-
men are removed from the total. In 1889, 7.2 percent of Iowa at-
risk employees sustained injury, while the national number of
trairunen injured was 8.3 percent. While Iowa's injury rate was
slightly lower than the national average, the commission under-
reported the numbers of injured railroad workers for 1889 by at
least 5.4 percent.
were at risk and what percentage of those employees were actually injured or
killed. This method of statistical backtracking poses some risks. Perhaps there
were fewer bureaucrats and more track workers during the 1870s than in the
1890s. It is more likely, however, that the figure of 46 percent still exaggerates
the number of employees exposed to danger, and thus underestimates the per-
centage of at-risk workers injured or killed. The commissioners, for example,
lumped switchmen, flagmen, and watchmen together, even though being a
switchman was far more hazardous than being a watchman or flagman. In
addition, the commission included the nebulous category of "other track
men," which accounted for about 20 percent of at-risk workers. Injuries on
work trains were frequent, but it is difficult to determine what other track-
related jobs may have been lumped under this category. Eliminating the cate-
gory "other track men" would leave about 25 percent of workers susceptible to
the majority of work-related injuries and deaths. I have decided to err on the
side of generosity; the numbers that follow may be somewhat low.
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Iowa's railroad commissioners did not intentionally mislead
their readers, but their smaller numbers did soften the bleak
outlook for Iowa railroaders. The fault was not theirs alone.
They did not collect their own data. According to commissioner
Lorenzo Coffin, it was "not the custom . . . of the Commission
. . . to investigate the maiming or the killing of a trairunan."'*
Instead, commissioners relied on railroad companies to state the
number of workers employed in Iowa and to report serious ac-
cidents. Because the commission never issued guidelines de-
scribing what should be reportable and which accidents might
be considered serious, railroad companies probably only re-
ported accidents that involved equipment damage. Although
Edward Laughlin's accident occurred a decade before the com-
mission was created, it is milikely that the IC would even have
reported it—remember that the railroad contended that he had
not sustained a serious injury.
Although impartial accident statistics were yet another ca-
sualty of the corporate drive to evade liability, the more modest
published figures were still sufficiently shocking to spark public
debate on railroad safety. When it became clear that railroad
commissions and state legislatures would not demand or im-
plement safety regulation, railroad brotherhoods and interested
private citizens began to lobby for safety nationwide. In 1889,
for example, more than ten thousand members of the Brother-
hood of Railroad Brakemen signed a petition in favor of rail-
76. Coffin, "Safety Appliances on the Railroads," 561.
77. This continued to be a national problem until Congress passed legislation
on March 3,1901, that required railroad companies to make detailed, monthly
accident reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission. I. L. Sharfman, The
Interstate Commerce Commission: A Study in Administrative Law and Procedure,
part one (New York, 1931), 256-57; Interstate Commerce Commission, Accident
Bulletin, No. 1, Showing Collisions and Derailments of Trains, and Casualties to Per-
sons, during July, August, and September, 1901 (Washington, DC, 1902), 9. H. R.
Fuller, lobbyist for the railroad brotherhoods, successfully argued that previ-
ous accident reporting standards that relied on overly broad descriptive cate-
gories misrepresented the causes of employee accidents. U.S. Congress, Senate,
Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, Testimony of H. R. Fuller, Legislative
Representative of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and Order
of Railroad Telegraphers, on the Bill (S. 3604) to Amend an Act to Promote the Safety
^Employees, etc., 56th Cong., 2d sess., 23 April 1900,1-2.
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road safety legislation and sent it to the ICC/* BLE members
also strongly supported legislative action to compel railroad
companies to install safety devices.
Iowa railroad commissioner Lorenzo Coffin emerged as the
most vocal advocate for workers' interests in the state." A de-
vout man, zealous reformer, and prosperous fanner from Eort
Dodge, Iowa, Coffin was appointed commissioner by Governor
John Sherman in 1883. As a commissioner. Coffin's humanitari-
anism made him more interested in safety problems than in
shipping rates—much to the irritation of his fellow commis-
sioners.^ With the full endorsement of the state's trainmen. Cof-
fin successfully lobbied the Iowa legislature to pass the Iowa
Safety Appliance Act in 1890. The act mandated that all newly
repaired railroad cars had to be equipped with safety or auto-
matic couplers. After January 1,1895, all cars used in Iowa would
have to be fitted with safer couplers. Finally, by January 1893,
Iowa trains had to have enough cars with air brakes installed to
allow the engineer to stop the train from the locomotive."
Workers throughout the nation hoped that the Iowa law
would provide a model for national action.^ ^ Again, Coffin was
an indefatigable ally. He wrote hundreds of letters to brother-
hood journals, "galvaniz[ing] the railroad unions to become
active in the drive for national legislation."" By 1892, Coffin
represented the Brotherhood of Railroad Trairunen and the
Order of Railway Conductors in meetings with the U.S. Rail-
road Commissioners.*^ Coffin also strove to eliminate the divi-
sions among the various brotherfioods that he thought might
hamper the cause. He reminded engineers, for example, that the
78. Usselman, "Air Brakes for Freight Trains," 47.
79. For a firsthand account of Coffin's activities, see Coffin, "Safety Appliances
on the Railroads."
80. Clark, "Railroad Safety Movement/' 283-86.
81. IBRC, Report, 1890 (Des Moines, 1891), 7-8.
82. See, for example. Locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 24 (1890), 797.
83. Aldrich, Safety First, 33.
84. The former Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen had changed its name to
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in 1890. For more on the meeting of
Coffin and the U.S. Railroad Commissioners, see Locomotive Engineers' Monthly
Journal 26 {1891), 157.
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real enemies were the railroad owners who allowed the killing
of brakemen to become so common that "the public have come
to think it an inseparable part of railroad transportation."*^ He
urged BLE members to write their congressmen and senators
in support of the railroad safety legislation then being debated
in Congress.**^  After years of pressure from citizen groups and
trainmen's organizations. Congress passed the Safety Appliance
Act in 1893." Railroad companies had seven years to bring in-
terstate cars up to code.
It is hard to overstate the importance of the railroad safety
movement for Iowa's railroaders. First and foremost, it dramati-
cally, albeit gradually, reduced injuries, especially among men
who coupled cars. More than half of all injuries to Iowa trainmen
in 1878 had been due to coupler mishaps {see table); in 1901, the
year after the national act took full effect, coupling accidents ac-
counted for only 8.2 percent of all injuries. Iowa's rail lines had
made little effort to install safety equipment on their own; the
combination of state and national acts, though erratically en-
forced, had the cumulative effect of creating a safer workplace.
Moreover, the safety movement marked the beginning of a
transformation in the relationships among corporate owners,
workers, and the state. In an earlier period, the brotherhoods
had attempted to claim that railroad officers and workers were
equals engaged in a common enterprise. BLE leaders especially
had perceived strikes as a measure of last resort, an unpleasant
period of readjustment in an otherwise productive relationship.
Railroaders, meanwhile, perceived the state as labor's adver-
sary. As the business and legal climate changed, however, it be-
came increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction that labor and
management held similar bargairüng power and shared a com-
mon interest in the trainman's welfare. Workers began to seek
out state regulation and mediation on issues such as safety. The
state, for its part, began to assert its authority to control aspects
of private enterprise with a portion of the enthusiasm that it
had previously reserved for the control of the nation's workers.
85. Ibid. 23 (1889), 987.
86. Ibid. 26 (1892), 262.
87. See Coffin, "Safety Appliances on the Railroads."
68 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
DESPITE IMPROVING CONDITIONS, railroaders realized
that they could not rely solely on the legal machinery of the
state to right the balance between workers and employers. They
never gave up their attack on the legal barriers of the doctrines
of the fellow servant and of contributory negligence, nor did
they assume that the terms of the Safety Appliance Act would
be enforced without continual agitafion. Even as the tide of in-
jury turned, however, trainmen took steps to care for some of
the thousands of already gravely injured men whom they as-
sumed would be ignored by companies and the state.
To do so, brotherhoods joined with private citizens to spon-
sor homes for disabled trainmen, such as the Highland Park
Home in Highland Park, Dlinois.^ ^ Some trairunen believed that
such a home, centrally located and modestly funded by all
brotherhoods, was sufficient. Others insisted that each brother-
hood had a duty to serve its own members exclusively. As
members vehemently debated the appropriate brotherhood re-
sponse to the widespread problem of occupational disability,
trainmen were forced to review their ideas about masculinity,
risk management, and individual responsibility. In envisioning
how they would care for their broken brothers, the brother-
f hoods defined the extent of their fraternal responsibilities to
each other.
^ The BLE debates over care for the disabled illustrate broader
trends in the brotherhoods. During most of the 1890s, BLE
members argued over the establishment of a home for disabled
engineers on a piece of BLE-owned farm property in Mattoon,
Illinois, known as Meadow Lawn. One vocal group, hearkening
back to notions that the disabled man was inherently less moral
than the able-bodied, argued that unscrupulous engineers
would feign a career-ending disability to get free care and food.
This group insisted, moreover, that trainmen who practiced
the ideals of railroad manhood would spurn charitable care.
BLE member Cyrus E. Gallatin scomed those brotherhood men
"who will not work in bad weather if they can avoid it; who
will not deny themselves anything they can get, and are decid-
88. Lorenzo Coffin served as president of this first national home for disabled
trainmen, established in 1890. Its official name was the Railroad Employees'
Home.
Courting Risk 69
edly improvident." It was such men, Gallatin implied, who
were most likely to become disabled in the first place. He
strongly objected to the creation of the Meadow Lawn Home,
insisting that it "would compel members who are industrious
and provident to provide a luxurious home for the shiftless and
improvident." Brother J. B. M. was even more blunt, accusing
the proposed home of providing a refuge for "engineers who
have spent their earnings at gaming tables, saloons, and worse
places." The hostility toward the disabled, when coupled with
comments about unscrupulousness and moral worth, suggests
that some BLE members still believed that injuries resulted from
incompetence and bad character.*'^
Another set of critics feared that Meadow Lawn would dis-
place men from their rightful place as heads of their own house-
holds, thereby further eroding the disabled worker's claim to
full masculirüty. Supporters of Meadow Lawn, however, in-
sisted that such would not be the case. T. H. Hiner proposed
that Meadow Lawn set up single-unit housing so that families
could live together. Such a family-centered approach, he ex-
plained, would make Meadow Lawn superior to other frater-
nal homes. "Do you, my Brother, want to go to a fraternal home
somewhere, perhaps where you may never see the good, loving
wife or dear children again; or would you rather go to the
Meadow Lawn Home, where you can all be together, . . . a
happy, unbroken family still?" Hiner drove home his point
by comparing the proposed family-friendly environment of
Meadow Lawn with the men-only care provided by the High-
land Park Home, where "families must be separated, and while
the husband is enjo5àng the comforts of that home, the good
wife may be starving."'^
Many members agreed that broken men need not also have
broken families, but resisted what they perceived as the re-
placement of the natal family with a "brotherhood family."
They complained that the BLE should not usurp the duties of
railroading families to provide care for elderly and disabled rel-
atives. Indeed, trainmen who opposed the home argued that old
89. Locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 34 (1900), 294, 295.
90. Ibid., 101.
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and disabled engineers would not want to leave the support of
their friends and family to live among strangers. One engineer
explained, "Nothing on earth would tempt me to go to any home
that would deprive me of my visits to my dear ones' graves."
According to such BLE members, a man—even a disabled man
—^would be diminished if removed from the context of his own
home. In their vision of brotherhood, members' fraternal duties
to one another were strictly limited to workplace concerns."
Most correspondents hoped that if Meadow Lawn became
a reality, it would serve as only a temporary retraining center,
quickly moving men with disabilities from unmanly depen-
dency to gainful employment. To that end, engineers con-
stantly insisted that their disabled brothers should have a
critical role in their own care and support. One engineer from
Cincinnati suggested that the BLE build an industrial plant
on the Meadow Lawn property to provide employment for
brothers who were out of work "on account of their age or
other disqualifications."'^
Rehabilitation to economic independence was only part of
the injured man's remasculinization, however. Both to negate
the common assumption that injured men had weak judgment
and to assure potential residents that their manly prerogative to
control their lives would not be denied them. Meadow Lawn
supporters insisted that the disabled men would retain their
independence. James Wood wrote that "everyone must be made
to feel that they are at home, and not under iron rules, as would
be the case in other institutions."" Brothers routinely feared that
strict governance would undennine the independence of men
who had considered themselves the indispensable leaders of the
train crew.
91. Ibid-, 104. Older engineers, such as Harry C. Smith, also worried about
antagonizing younger BLE members. He explained, "The old fellows don't
want a home where they know they are eating the bread of charity drawn
from unwilling Brothers' pockets." It is unlikely, however, that all of Smith's
older comrades would have agreed with his conclusion that "they would pre-
fer the County [Poor] House, most likely," Ibid., 167.
92. Ibid., 35. Compare the Locomotive Firemen's Magazine 14 (1890), 705, which
noted approvingly that the Miesse-Thorp Railway Brotherhood Hospital
planned to use permanently disabled brotherhood men as male nurses.
93. Locotnotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 34 (1900), 167.
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At the BLE's 1900 biennial convention held in Milwaukee,
the matter was finally settled. Delegates agreed to sell Meadow
Lawn Farm, and the idea of the Meadow Lawn Home died.
One member concluded that the resolution "was a stroke of
wisdom and common sense, and does away with a very an-
noying question."*^ Correspondents, exhausted by a decade of
debates, fell silent. In the year following the convention, not one
letter attempted to revive the issue.'^
Even the most hostile critics of brotherhood-centered care
recognized that someone needed to tend to the most unfortu-
nate in their ranks. They were less enthusiastic, however, about
footing the bill. Iowa brotherhood locals supported a privately
operated railroad employees' home in Highland Park, Illinois.
Highland Park Secretary F. M. Ingalls happily told Iowa's con-
ductors that the home's rehabilitation program was a success,
bragging that two of the five residents of the home had left
when they were able to "obtain situations by which they Ccin
earn their own livelihood, having learned their trades while in-
mates of the institution." Ingalls indicated, however, that some
conductors doubted whether the benefits were worth the costs.
Although Ingalls reassured members that he ran the home
economically, he admitted that the home was "not a financial
success." He then went on to chide the railroad brotherhoods
for their failure to contribute more, especially in light of their
swelling treasuries. "The great growth of the several orgarüza-
tions is apparent from their reports, and if one and all would
do their part by contributing their mite we could build and
maintain a 'Home' for the unfortunate railway man that would
stand out before the world a monument of orgaiùzed labor."'*
Although Ingalls tried to remain optimistic, the fact remained
that of the thousands of disabled railroaders in the Midwest
alone, only five railroaders lived at Highland Park. After three
years, the home had not captured much support from the
brotherhoods.
94. Ibid. 35 (1901), 618.
95. Of course, it is possible that editor C. H. Salmons simply refused to print
any further letters on the subject.
96. Railway Conductor 10 (1893), 25. The ORC was based in Cedar Rap ds.
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Highland Park officers realized that acceptance would take
time. In 1893 Lorenzo Coffin, r\ational railroad safety advocate
and president of the home, commented, "It is a work of time
and patience, to educate men up to the proper point of caring
for a fellow and brother railway man." Coffin tried to elicit
support by giving residential care a human face. He mentioned
inmates by name, asking trainmen to consider what would
happen if the home closed.
Shall this old engineer, Mr. Fish, now eighty-four years old; shall
this conductor, Mr. Bangs, perfectly helpless; shall this fireman,
Mr. Nace, with one leg; shall these helpless and suffering crippled
men be turned upon the cold charity of the world, only to find
their way, eventually, to the county poorhouse; from which we
took our first inmate of the "Home," and who now is making a
good living at the jeweler's trade, which the "Home" enabled him
to learn? Already has the "Home" rescued three grand young men
from hopeless dependency to self-sustaining independence.
Coffin stressed the dual goal of rehabilitation and manly re-
invigoration. Although he equated disability with "hopeless
dependency," he also viewed dependency as a temporary con-
dition. The home would remake "men" of the disabled by re-
storing their earning capacity. Coffin recogrüzed, however, that
some trairunen were too disabled to return to the work force. In
such cases. Coffin appealed to anxiety and self-interest to elicit
contributions. "How soon some of these now contributing will
be the suffering ones, none of us can tell.""
Although Frank IngaUs claimed that Highland Park was a
success despite having only three permanent residents, his Feb-
ruary 1893 quarterly report to the BLE's monthly journal indi-
cates that engineers were once again wavering in their support
of men with disabilities. At one point, the BLE voted to recog-
nize the home only if it managed to get the endorsement of all
eleven BLE divisions within Chicago. Coming at the height of
the Meadow Lawn debate, this withdrawal of support must
have been a blow to Highland Park organizers. As the BLE gave
up on Meadow Lawn, however, divisions did send more dis-
97. Ibid., (1893), 100,101.
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abled members to the Highland Park Home. In 1900 Highland
Park housed twenty residents; seven of them were engineers.
By 1900, all of the brotherhoods, the brotherhoods' ladies
auxiliaries, and the ladies auxiliary to the Railroad YMCA sup-
ported Highland Park.'^  Voluntary donatior\s from the brother-
hoods, however, meant seasonal fluctuations in generosity.
Highland Park suffered from donation patterns that still plague
charitable institutions. Donations increased during the holiday
season, then declined thereafter. Lorenzo Coffin's dedication to
the home project was readily apparent when he loaned the
home $250 and gave it "two fine shoats" to help make ends
meet during the lean summer months.""
Coffin's frustration over the brotherhoods' intermittent in-
terest in and inconsistent funding of care for their own mem-
bers was evident. He began one angry letter by denouncing
those who would deny the costly realities of disability: "Why
can not men understand? Or do they understand, and are they
thoughtless and a little mean?" Coffin huffed that brotherhood
locals were more than willing to shuffle off their disabled men
to the Home but refused to donate money to sustain its work.' '
The chrorûc underfunding of the Highland Park Home
suggests railroad workers' continuing ambivalence toward their
disabled comrades. In a changing atmosphere of state inter-
vention and increased corporate control of the workplace, the
able-bodied reckoned anew with their assumptions about occu-
pational disability, manhood, and the nature of their brotherly
obligations to each other. Should they commit themselves to an
ever-increasing collectivity in all things or should they vigor-
ously defend their manly prerogative to control their homes,
families, and bodies even if they could no longer control their
workplace? Their debates over the character and needs of the
98. Ibid., 187; Locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 34 (1900), 176.
99. Highland Park was even well known enough to receive donations from
individuals and groups not directly associated with railroad organizations. In
November 1899 a group from Fort Worth, Texas, describing itself as "families
and friends of railroad people," donated money and a box of groceries to the
home. Locomotive Engineers' Monthly Journal 34 (1900), 35.
100. Ibid., 35, 111, 357,577.
101. Ibid, 30 (1896), 757.
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disabled, like their wavering support for their injured com-
rades, reveal that trainmen were not yet ready to abandon ar\
individualistic notion of masculine rights and responsibility in
favor of a more fratemalistic conception. Although they were
willing to recognize the need for care for those wiöi serious dis-
abilities, they hesitated to commit themselves to an overarching
fraternal vision that would have transcended individual re-
sponsibility and family-centered care.
EARLY IN THE NOVEL that gave the Gilded Age its name, a
calamitous boiler explosion destroys a steamboat, killing at least
a hundred people. A jury of inquest returns "the inevitable
American verdict... NOBODY TO BLAME."'"^  The anecdote, based
on a true story, captures the state of the popular imagination
concerning workplace safety during the late nineteenth century.
Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, many people (train-
men included) persisted in believing that the hazards of the
workplace were either unavoidable or that workers alone bore
the resporisibility for protecting themselves from harm. The
idea that employers were best positioned to alleviate workplace
danger and probably would not do so voluntarily was an idea
slow to develop in American society.
During the Gilded Age, railroads chose to pursue profits
over the safety of their work force. They could do so because
legislators and jurists hesitated to interfere with private enter-
prise. This context helps to account for delayed implementation
of safety technologies in the workplace and corporate evasion of
legal liability for occupational disability. While such conditions
hampered the efforts of Iowa trainmen to address the dangers
of their workplace, they are not the whole story. To explain fully
the processes that led to changes in workplace relations and
the treatment of disabled workers, one must also consider the
workers themselves. Trainmen initially believed that risk suc-
cessfully flaunted was the measure of the true railroader and
man, and skillfiil disregard of danger reflected competence.
These attitudes changed, however, as the scale of the problem of
102. Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today,
2d ed. (1873; reprint. New York, 1994), 48.
Courting Risk 75
danger and disability became apparent during the 1880s. Courts
were slow to perceive what workers and managers already
knew: the impersonal rationalization of industrial capitalism
had altered the face-to-face relationship between employers and
employees that veteran trairunen, who had begun their careers
when railroads themselves were new, had learned to expect in
ihe early days of railroading.
This transitional period encompassed a complex set of
interwoven issues. The rapid growth of American industry
during the Gilded Age placed excessive demands on the na-
tion's railroads. Increased rail traffic and a faster pace of work
increased the number of accidents. Injuries mounted as vola-
tile economic conditions made railroad companies unwilling
to cope with even limited financial demands from their injured
workers. When corporations attempted to rationalize their pol-
icies on safety and worker compensation, workers perceived
that the proposed solutions violated long-held understandings
about workplace control. Moreover, the solutions struck at the
roots of working-class masculine ideology. Working men were
to be denied both the right to make their own decisions in the
workplace and the ability to see themselves as equal partners
in the labor-management relationship. They could no longer
sustain the illusion that they controlled their economic or
physical destirües, nor could they be sure that they could pro-
vide for their families or protect them from want.^ "
103. Working-class ideals of manhood did not accurately reflect the realities of
working-class family life. Although men saw themselves as the stable centers
of economic activity and used their assumed position as "head of household"
to argue for a higher "family wage," many families survived only because of
the economic activities of other household members. See Christine Stansell,
City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, Í789-1860 (Urbana and Chicago,
1986); Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work: Houseiuork, Wages, and the Ideology of
Labor in the Early Republic (New York, 1990); Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work
A History of Wage-Earning Women in tlie United States (New York, 1982); and
Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Worbng Women and Leisure in Tum-of-the-
Century New York (Philadelphia, 1986). It is unwise, moreover, to assume that
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See Kessler-Harris, "Treating the Male as 'Other.'" See also John Williams-
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Although trairunen's debates over safety and disability dur-
ing the Gilded Age indicate that the idea of a risk-filled indi-
viducilistic manliness was slow to change, railroad brother-
hoods finally began to demand federal laws to require railroads
to install safety appliances. The industrial excesses of the Gilded
Age prompted trainmen to demand a new relationship between
themselves and the state. In Iowa industrial safety was an issue
that revealed their efforts to create a new relationship between
citizen-workers and the government; the Safety Appliance Act
was one result. But, as trainmen soon discovered, the state was
an imperfect ally.
Despite technological improvements, increased legal protec-
tions, and more rational attitudes toward risk-taking, trainmen
remained skeptical about the state of safety on Iowa railroads.
In 1905 the Iowa Bureau of Labor Statistics asked workers,
"What specific legislation would benefit wage earners in your
occupation?" Iowa railroaders replied by demanding greater
attention to safety issues. Judging from their responses, Iowa
railroaders felt that lack of enforcement and meaningful pen-
alties for violation undermined the effectiveness of the Safety
Appliance Act. A brakeman from Council Bluffs commented,
"We need better enforcement of the safety appliance laws, also
the enactment of an employer's liability law that will force rail-
ways to take care of the cripples they make." Other trainmen,
such as locomotive engineers and switchmen, echoed those sen-
timents, with a switchman from Shenandoah concluding, "The
enforcement of the present safety appliance law is the most
needed at present."'"^ While demanding more federal regulation
and better enforcement, the railroad brotherhoods also saw the
need for worker-centered responses to help mend the broken
bodies that industrial capitalism continued to produce. The
very tentativeness with which trainmen embraced the notion of
fraternal care for the disabled, however, demonstrates a resis-
tance to the gradual reconfiguration of masculine identity in the
rail trades.
103. Iowa Bureau of Labor Statistics, Twelflh Report . . . for the Year 1905 (Des
Moines, 1907), 188,189,193.
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After decades of trivializing the risks of their occupation
and scorning men who were injured on the job, Iowa trainmen
were finally ready to admit the dangerous atmosphere in which
they labored. Moreover, they seemed more willing to criticize
their employers for creating and sustaining conditions in which
accidents were all too common. A spirit of confrontation, absent
in the days of brotherhood-company collaboration, began to
emerge as workers turned to the courts, the U.S. Congress, state
legislatures, and the workplace itself to make their lives more
secure. Able-bodied men still had a long way to go before the
new commitment to safety would be accompanied by a trans-
formed attitude tow^ard the disabled workers among them.. It
would take time to mend the broken brotherhoods.
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